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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Britian

Lee Barr appeals from

exploitation of a child.

recognizing

it

Barr contends the

by not recognizing

additionally claims, for the ﬁrst time

set forth in

Statement
In

was

judgment of conviction
district court

ﬁve counts of sexual

for

abused

its

Of The

it

by not

could run those sentences concurrently.

0n appeal,

that the

Idaho Code section 19-2520G

Facts

And Course Of The

March 2017, a

is

(R., p.71.)

Barr

mandatory minimum sentencing

unconstitutional.

Proceedings

detective with the “Internet Crimes Against Children Taskforce

investigating the downloading and sharing 0f child pornography”

network.”

discretion

could designate some portions of the ﬁve consecutive 15-year sentences as

indeterminate, and

scheme

his

Based on

that investigation

on a “peer

law enforcement determined

to peer

that LP.

addresses connected to Barr showed “thousands of downloads of child pornography.”

(R., p.71.) Detectives

homeless

shelter,

“they found computer storage devices,”

Barr was later found
for Barr’s

obtained search warrants and, after searching Barr’s

at the library

and

backpack and the “laptop,

found inside

it.

(R., p.72.)

A

among

at a local

other things. (R., p.72.)

arrested; detectives secured

[Barr’s] cell

room

an additional warrant

phones and computer storage devices”

forensic analysis 0f those devices

hundreds of photos and Videos of child pornography.

showed they contained

(R., p.73.)

Barr admitted t0

ofﬁcers that he had been downloading child pornography. (R., pp.72-73.)

Barr was charged with ﬁve counts 0f sexual exploitation of a child based on ﬁve

0f the Videos that were recovered.

(R., pp.34-36.)

The

state additionally

ﬁled an

Information Part

to

II

alleging that Barr

mandatory minimum sentences per

The

state’s “[1]ast

was a repeat sex
I.C. §

offender, and, as such,

19-2520G.1

tentative

and best” settlement offer prior

agreement was forwarded to the

t0 trial

district court for its

The proposed agreement was taken up
p.50.)

The agreement apparently envisioned

December

a

at

was a proposed binding

L9.) The

district court

review.

had questions regarding how

(E R., p.46.)
(R.,

would run concurrent

(E 12/28/17
would work

this

(R., p.138.)

2017 hearing.

28,

that Barr’s sentence

with additional time he was facing for a probation Violation.

p.8,

subject

(R., pp.48-49.)

Rule 11 agreement, contemplating a 50-year sentence With 20 years ﬁxed.

The

was

Tr., p.6,

in light

L.4

—

of the

mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement:

[THE COURT2] Then the other question that
3E of this agreement on page two, it talks
concurrent t0 any other cases the defendant

is

reviewed Idaho Code Section 19-2520(G),

must run consecutive

t0

had, counsel, 0n subsection

about the sentences running
serving time on.
it

seemed

any other sentence imposed

doesn’t cite any prior sentence.
court, but that section

I

It

And When I

t0 indicate that

it

the court and

it

by

says any other sentence imposed

would apply

to the ﬁrst part

by the

of the sentence, not the

second part 0f the sentence.

And

so

struck

I

didn’t d0 any research

me

as this deal

beyond looking

at the

code section, but

it

might not work out the way you guys had planned
statute, but I’m not entirely certain that the

based upon the language in the
language applies.

The very

last sentence.

2520(G).

It

says:

“Any

sentence imposed under the

provisions of this section shall run consecutive to any other sentence

imposed by the

1

The

court.”

The words “any other”

certainly carry a fairly broad interpretation.

“any other” means, any

other.

state also

initially

Imean,

ﬁled additional charges in a separate case, CR-17-38164, which was

consolidated With this case below.

(E

R., pp.32-33.)

The

state ultimately

dismissed case CR-17-38164 as part 0f its plea bargain with Barr. (5/5/18
2.)

T11, p.5, Ls.1-

So based 0n

that,

MR. DINGER: Your

[Prosecutor]

What

Iwasn’t quite sure

the case that I’ve seen

we wanted t0 proceed this

if

Honor, there

is that’s

is

morning.

some case law on

this.

kind of talking about the different

counts, that they have t0 run consecutive one t0 another. I’ve never seen

anything on whether, you know, he has another case out there with a
probation Violation and

Ithink

There

I

is

has t0 run concurrent t0

it

said “consecutive.”

I

that.

mean, concurrent.

case law from the Court of Appeals that says, you know, if you

plead to two counts,

it

has to be 30 years.

It

has to be 15 plus 15.

So that’s—so my reading of that is why we only ﬁled the enhancements in
the one case and not the other so that we could arrive at this. And it’s not

my reading that it has to run consecutive t0 his probation Violation.
THE COURT:
court.”

And

does say “any other sentence imposed by the
guess Where I kind 0f struggle is it doesn’t say “any other

I

Well,

it

sentence previously imposed.”

imposed by the court
leaves

at the

some ambiguity

So

that’s not a

doesn’t say “any other sentence

it

same time

as this sentence” or whatever.

It

in there.

MR. DINGER: And we
case.

And

are asking this to run consecutive t0 the second

problem because

it’s

just

the—I guess

it’s

just the

probation Violation.

THE COURT:

I

think the second case

was running consecutive

t0 this

case.

MR. DINGER:

Sure.

THE COURT:

So

t0 address

it

I

just didn’t

With counsel

know. Iread

at the

this further before proceeding, 0r if

obviously

we

still

need

MR. DINGER: The

t0

it

far

enough

to think

I

wanted

hearing t0 see if you guys want t0 look at

you

just

go through the Info

want t0 proceed. And if so,
Two part and parcel process.

Your Honor, is that is referring
I’m
comfortable going forward, but certainly I’d
to different counts. And
defer t0 the court and [defense counsel] Mr. Stewart.
case law that I’ve read,

THE COURT: What d0 you think, Mr.
(12/28/17 T11, p.5, L.5

— p.7,

L.19.)

Stewart?

Barr’s attorney agreed that Idaho case lawz

showed

that different counts

“have t0

run consecutive one to another”:

Honor, I’m trying

MR. STEWART: Your
is

0n point

There

MR. STEWART:

is

up the case that I—that

And—

t0 this issue.

THE COURT:

t0 pull

a case 0n point?

Well, not exactly 0n point, but

it’s

referring t0

sentencings ofeach count needs t0 run consecutive t0 each other.

say anything about prior sentencings.
that’s the

count has
there’s

same case
t0

that counsel has cited

run consecutive

an enhancement.

I

t0

think the

—

p.8,

14.)

The

state’s prior offer

ﬁve counts and

L.18 — p.5, L.2.)

talks

didn’t

think

about each

case at sentencing if
formulated it and looking at
in the

not an illegal sentence.

ﬁxed sentence on January

altered).)

25, 2018.

Barr

(R., p.138.)

to trial.

the second day of

guilty to all

It

affect. I

L.10 (emphasis added, paragraph break

rejected the state’s offer 0f a 20-year

On

Where itjust

way we

it’s

any

the

A11 right.

(12/28/17 Tr., p.7, L.20

The case proceeded

that plays

each other

the statute and the case law, Ithink

THE COURT:

How

how

trial

was now off

t0

(5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.7-

Barr decided to plead guilty.

the table; as such, Barr

admit to being a repeat sex offender.

Everyone below—including the

state, Barr,

now

agreed t0 plead

(E 5/15/18

Tr., p.4,

Barr’s counsel, and the

2

The state and Barr seemed t0 be referring t0 State V. Morton, an unpublished opinion in
Which the Court 0f Appeals afﬁrmed that the language 0f LC. § 19-2520G means What it
says: that “any sentence imposed under the provision of this section shall run consecutive
t0 any other sentence imposed by the court,” Which by deﬁnition includes additional
sentences imposed under 19-2520G. 2016 WL 6677881 at *2 (2016). Barr tut-tuts the
prosecutor for “improperly cit[ing]” this case at sentencing (Appellant’s brief, p.16, n.7),

but this one-way admonishment ignores the entire exchange in Which his

approvingly cited the same case

(ﬂ

12/28/17 Tr., p.7, L.20

— p.8,

L.9).

own

attorney

district

court—understood

that this

meant

that Barr

would be

subject to

ﬁve consecutive

15-year sentences. (5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-25; p.15, Ls.14-19; p.33, Ls.22-25.)

The

ﬁrst person t0 put this shared understanding

0n the record was Barr’s own

counsel:

THE COURT:

MR. STEWART:

Yes, Your Honor. Mr. Barr, will be pleading guilty to

ﬁve counts of sexual
there’s

exploitation 0f a child;

He will also plead
a minimum mandatory

ending 341

So

if you would please, put the material terms of
0n the record.

Mr. Stewart,

the plea bargain agreement

13.

all

counts are in case number

to the repeat sex offender

enhancement.

15 yearsfor a total 0f 75 years

minimum

for allﬁve counts.
(5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-25 (emphasis added, paragraph break a1tered).)
Barr’s counsel afﬁrmed that he “review[ed] the plea bargain agreement” With his

client

and “explain[ed] the consequences”

himself afﬁrmed that he understood
“essentially 75 years

ﬁxed time

that,

in prison.”

to him.

(5/15/18 Tr., p.7, Ls.6-8.)

he did not go to

if

(5/15/18 Tr., p.10, L.21

likewise afﬁrmed he understood “that the court Virtually

ﬁnal sentence because of the Information Part
could not “reduce the sentence 0r
(5/15/18 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-21.)

ﬁve counts and admitted

make

trial,

it

—

would have n0

Two” and

that

Barr

he would face
p.11, L6.)

Barr

discretion in the

he understood the court

run concurrently 0r anything like that.”

Following a thorough colloquy Barr pleaded guilty to

the sentencing enhancement.

(5/15/18 Tr., p.21, L.13

all

—

p.25,

to

ﬁve

L25.)
In light of everyone’s understanding that Barr

would be sentenced

consecutive 15-year ﬁxed sentences, the district court asked whether they should just

proceed to sentencing that day:

I

could order another mental health evaluation or things 0f that nature. But

t0 the extent that the

sentence isﬁxed,

the presentence report 0r the rest

impact 0n what I can d0 0r What

My point
believe

is

here that

I

doesn

’t

seem

0f these materials
might need

t0

t0

is

make

me

that ordering

able t0 have

much

a ﬁnal decision.

have accepted the defendant’s guilty plea.

I

truly

been given freely and voluntarily, knowingly and

it’s

that

I

it

intelligently, etcetera.

from counsel as t0 whether we should just proceed with
now or whether you want to go through the process 0f
getting a PSI, a PSE and mental health review, that kind 0f stuff. I don’t
see what we get out of that and it seems like almost a waste of time and
money because this is not the kind 0f a sentence that I have any real

So

I’d like t0 hear

the sentencing right

discretion in.

So, Mr. Stewart.

— p.31, L.15 (emphasis

(5/15/18 Tr., p.30, L.22

agreed With the

added).)

As

it

happened, defense counsel

district court:

MR. STEWART: Your

Honor, ifthe court

is

inclined t0 just sentence him

minimum mandatory, Ithink we can go forward today. If the
inclined t0 do more than the 75 years, then I think we need—
t0 the

court

is

THE COURT: Can I d0 more?
MR. DINGER:

THE COURT:

I

don’t believe so.

Idon’t think so

MR. STEWART:

THE COURT:

Okay.

Ithink the underlying offenses Without the Information Part

TWO enhancement is
Part

either.

Two, then

I

a

maximum ten years.

would have,

let’s say,

a

Ithink Without the Information

maximum

range of zero to 50

years combined.

So

in theory

I

could impose a less straight sentence, but with a mandatory
count, consecutive, I don’t know

minimum being I5 years ﬁxed 0n each
that I really have much discretion.

So I’m just not sure What’s the point of ordering these additional things.
Having said that too, all 0f those materials are available and I could read

the 01d documents and things of that nature, but even doing that,

see

how that does any good more

MR. STEWART:

THE COURT:

I

agree.

— p.32, L.17 (emphasis

Prior to the imposition 0f the

nature,

for essentially the rest 0f his

When he opined
life, I

added).)

ﬁve 15-year sentences, defense counsel again
that

“[njow that [Barr’s] going

Tr., p.34,

L.23

—

should not proceed With the sentencing

“No.” (5/15/18

The

prison

p.35, L.1 (emphasis added).)

the district court asked defense counsel, “is there any legal cause

Why we

t0

think that’s part 0f the consequences that he’s got to

follow and he understands that.” (5/15/18

When

We can move forward today.

Mr. Dinger, what are your thoughts here?

(5/15/18 Tr., p.31, L.16

ﬁxed

don’t

or less.

I agree, Your Honor.

MR. DINGER: Your Honor,

alluded t0 their

I

at this

you can think 0f

time,” defense counsel responded

Tr., p.37, Ls.19-22.)

district court

After expressing

some

accepted Barr’s pleas.
“frustration With

(5/15/18 T11, p.37, L.23

—

p.38,

L3.)

mandatory minimum sentences” the court

concluded with the following:

impose a sentence because this is what the law requires it. While the offenses
committed by the defendant are highly offensive and contribute to the making
and spreading 0f Vile child pornography and exploitation of children.
I

case—I do think it would be possible for me to
fashion a sentence that was not as severe if I had the discretion to do so,
but I don’t have that discretion and I can only assume by Virtue that the
law that we have is based upon a fundamental ﬁnding that Mr. Barr and
other defendants in similar circumstances are a danger t0 the community
and must be imprisoned for the safety of the community and/or t0 serve

The sentence

in this

the obj ectives of punishment 0r retribution.
it

might have

others that this

And

to that general deterrence; that
is

What could happen.

ﬁnally t0 whatever effect
is,

sending a message t0

So

in

that

regard

because

the

legislature

has

determined What

is

reasonable, fair and just, the court ﬁnds 0n the basis 0f the legislature’s
declaration and law that

(5/15/18 Tr., p.39, L.1

The
p.189.)

He

— p.40,

district court

it is

as a matter 0f law reasonable, fair

and just.

L.2; p.41, Ls.4-25.)

sentenced Barr to ﬁve consecutive 15-year ﬁxed sentences. (R.,

timely appeals. (R., pp.196-98.)

ISSUES
Barr states the issue on appeal

as:

Section 19-2520G requires a mandatory

minimum uniﬁed

sentence of

ﬁfteen years for each of the ﬁve counts; however, did the district court err
it lacked any discretion t0 impose an aggregate sentence
75 years ﬁxed?

in concluding that
less harsh than

(Appellant’s brief, p.5)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Did Barr

any error below by inducing and acquiescing to the district court’s
conclusions that the ﬁve 15-year sentences would need to be ﬁxed and run
invite

consecutive t0 each other?

II.

meaning of the statute and controlling case law, Has Barr
show the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the statute
mandates a ﬁxed sentence consecutive t0 any other sentence imposed by the
In light of the plain
failed to

court?

III.

Has Barr
does

it

error?

0f constitutional error and, even if preserved,
0n the merits because Barr fails argue, much less show, fundamental

failed t0 preserve his claim

fail

ARGUMENT
I.

Any Error Below BV Inducing And Acquiescing In The District Court’s
Conclusions That The Five 15-Year Sentences Would Need T0 Be Fixed And Run

Barr Invited

Consecutive T0 Each Other

Everyone below—the

district court, the state,

court did not have discretion t0 run Barr’s

indeterminate time.

and Barr—agreed

ﬁve sentences concurrently 0r

its

concurrently or

As

t0 set

(5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-25; p.15, Ls.14-19; p.33, Ls.22-25.)

appeal Barr abandons that position and reverses course: he
court abused

that the district

discretion because

failed t0 perceive

it

it

now

was any

error,

On

claims that the district

could have run his sentences

ﬁxed some smaller portion 0f them. (Appellant’s

a threshold matter, if there

any

brief, pp.8-20.)

Barr invited

it

Barr

below.

repeatedly induced and acquiesced in the district court’s conclusion that the ﬁve 15-year

sentences were required to be consecutive and ﬁxed.

5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-25; p.31, L.16

the district court erred

—

—

(12/28/17 Tr., p.7, L.20

p.32, L.13; p.34, L.23

by agreeing With Barr and concluding

— p.35,
it

L.1.)

had n0

T0

p.8, L.9;

the extent

discretion,

it

was

an invited error that cannot form the basis of his direct appeal.

“The doctrine of invited
his 0r her

own

176, 187,

254 P.3d 77, 88

error applies t0 estop a party

from asserting an

conduct induces the commission 0f the error.” State

864 P.2d 654, 657

(Ct.

(Ct.

App. 201

App. 1993)).

important role in prompting a

trial

It

1) (citing State V.

make

When

Norton, 15 1 Idaho

Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819,

seeks t0 prevent a party

court” to

V.

error

who

“caused or played an

a particular decision from “later

challenging that decision on appeal.” State V. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117,

120 (1999).

“One may not complain of

errors

10

one has consented

t0 or acquiesced in.”

m,

151 Idaho at 187, 254 P.3d at 88 (citing State V. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706

P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State

V.

Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605, 961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App.

1998)).

Barr had every opportunity below to unveil his claims that the
the discretion to run concurrent or indeterminate sentences.

the pre-trial conference,

Where the

the core 0f this appeal: LC. §

under the provisions of

by the

parties spent

19-2520G and

this section shall

court.” (12/28/17 Tr., p.5, L.5

Barr’s counsel weighed in

had the discretion

to

on

its

The

district court

ﬁrst opportunity

ﬁve minutes discussing

had

came

at

the minutiae at

requirement that “[a]ny sentence imposed

run consecutive t0 any other sentence imposed

— p.8,

L.9.)

this exact issue

and instead 0f arguing

that the court

run concurrent sentences he stated the opposite—that Idaho case law

required the sentences t0 be consecutive.

(E

12/28/17 T11, p.7, L.20

—

p.8, L.9.)

Barr

claimed that there was a case, Which he thought was more 0r less “on point,” that talked
“about each count has t0 run consecutive t0 each other in the case at sentencing

an enhancement.” (12/28/17

Tr., p.7,

instructed the district court there

L.20 — p.8, L.6 (emphasis added).) Because Barr

was Idaho case law

that said “the sentencings

count need[] t0 run consecutive to each other” he cannot
“misperce[ived]”

its

if there’s

discretion or otherwise erred.

now

claim the

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

any “misperception” below Barr unmistakably invited

of each

district court

If there

was

it.

Similarly, Barr ignored every opportunity at sentencing to argue that the district

court could

ﬁx

less than

75 years

total.

(E 5/15/18 Tr.)

Instead, defense counsel talked

about the opposite: he said Barr would be “plead[ing] t0 the repeat sex offender

enhancement,” and “[s]0 there’s a

minimum mandatory

11

15 years for a total 0f 75 years

minimumfor allﬁve

counts.” (5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.22-25 (emphasis added).) There

doubt defense counsel’s arithmetic meant 75 years ﬁxed time—this

is

precisely

that Barr

(m 5/15/18

was “going

And

TL, p.32, Ls.4-14.)

sentence.

(m 5/15/18

Despite

Tr., p.34,

ﬁxed time

made n0

to think

it

“75 years

the equivalent of a

ﬁx

less than

75 years.

5/15/18 Tr.) Instead, Barr’s counsel actively induced the district court

Tr.;

had no

is

noises below that the district

court had any discretion to run the sentences concurrently 0r to

(m 12/28/17

defense counsel stated

Ls.23-24.)

the opportunities Barr’s counsel

all

why

of his 1ife”—because defense

to prison for essentially the rest

counsel, like everyone else, understood that 75 years of

life

Why

this is

no

would be

counsel, like everyone else, agreed that ordering any presentence materials

unnecessary.

is

discretion:

minimum

for all

he referred t0 a “mandatory minimum” that he calculated as

ﬁve counts”; purported

there

was case law holding

that a

“sentence imposed under the provisions 0f this section shall run consecutive t0 any other
sentence imposed by the court”; referred to his client going t0 prison “for essentially the
rest

0f his

life”;

and requested

(12/28/17 TL, p.7, L.20
p.34, L.23

— p.35,

—

that

p.8, L.9;

n0 presentence investigation be done
5/15/18 Tr., p.4, Ls.15-25; p.31, L.16

as a result.

—

p.32, L.17;

L.1.)

In sum, Barr led the district court to believe that

the sentences With

ﬁxed consecutive time—and

understanding, shared

by everyone below,

had n0 discretion

in

imposing

very least Barr acquiesced in the

that the district court

Because Barr invited any error below he cannot

12

at the

it

now raise

this

had no

discretion.

purported error on appeal.

II.

In Light

The

Of The

District

Plain Language

Court Abused

Its

Of The

Fixed Sentence Consecutive
A.

Statute

And Idaho

BV
T0 Any Other

Precedent, Barr Fails

Sentence Imposed

BV The

A

Court

Introduction

Contrary t0 everything he said below, Barr argues 0n appeal that the
actually

had the discretion “to run

other.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.)

now

To Show

Concluding That The Statute Mandates

Discretion

[his]

And

district court

ﬁfteen—year sentences concurrently with each

contrary to everything he indicated below, Barr

argues that the district court had the additional discretion t0 “designate the

and

indeterminate

determinate

0f

portions

Barr’s

Mr.

ﬁfteen-year

(Appellant’s brief, p.8 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).)

court erred

he puts

it,

sentences.”

Barr claims the

by not sua sponte discovering these newly found wellsprings of discretion;
the district court “misperce[ived] that

it

as

lacked discretion to impose any less

severe sentence.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

Barr

that

it

fails to

show

error

0n both

fronts.

First, the district court correctly

concluded

could not run the sentences concurrently because Section 19-2520G’s plain

language plainly forbids

it:

the statute states that

“Any

sentence imposed under the

provisions 0f this section shall run consecutive t0 any other sentence imposed by the
court.”

I.C.

§

19-2520G(3) (emphasis added).

mandates that sentences

shall

Because the

statute’s plain

language

run consecutive to any other sentence, without limitation,

and because the ﬁve sentences here were other sentences, they were required

to run

consecutively.

Regarding Barr’s determinate-time argument,
abjured by the Idaho Court 0f Appeals.

it

has already been addressed and

In State V. Ephraim, the Court held in

13

n0

uncertain terms that “LC. § 19-2520G, requires that the mandatory

served in conﬁnement and, as such,

179,

267 P.3d 1291, 1294

(Ct.

is

minimum

sentence be

a ‘ﬁxed’ 0r determinate sentence.” 152 Idaho 176,

Barr purports that that case was “wrongly

App. 2011).

decided and should be rejected 0r overruled” but he does not come close t0 showing

that.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.8-14.)
Because the

and the controlling case law required Barr’s sentences

statute

ﬁxed and run consecutively he

B.

Standard

The

fails to

t0

be

show an abuse 0f discretion.

Of Review

interpretation

and construction of a

Which the appellate court exercises

free review.

102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State

V.

statute present questions

State V.

Dom, 140

of law over

Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 798,

Idaho 404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct.

App. 2004).

When

an appellant alleges an abuse 0f discretion on appeal, “the appellate court

must determine:
discretion; (2)

(1)

Whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one 0f

whether the lower court acted within the boundaries 0f such discretion and

consistently With any legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices before

Whether the lower court reached

its

decision

Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430, 437, 362 P.3d

does

“not

recognize

the

“remand[ed] t0 allow the

scope

of

its

district court t0

1,

by an exercise of reason.

8 (Ct.

App. 2015). Where a

discretion”

Idaho’s

appellate

m

it;

and

(3)

district court

courts

have

reconsider the motion to correct the illegal

sentences with knowledge of the full scope 0f its discretion.” Li.

14

C.

Of Section 19-2520G, The

Per The Plain Language

Run

Consecutivelv

The

objective of statutory interpretation

is to

Sentences

give effect to legislative intent. State

149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison

V. Pina,

Were Required T0

V.

Bateman—Hall,

Inc.,

139

Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because the best guide t0 legislative intent
the wording 0f the statute

Verska

words.

506 (201
statute

1);

‘6‘

V. Saint

State V.

itself,

the interpretation 0f a statute

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.

Ctr.,

must be given

151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502,

their plain, usual,

is

and ordinary meaning; and the

State V. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362,

unambiguous,

statute

must be

not ambiguous, this Court does not construe

simply follows the law as written.” VLska, 151 Idaho

is

its literal

Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). The words ofa

construed as a whole. If the statute

language

must begin With

is

at 893,

265 P.3d

79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)).

legislative history

at

it,

but

506 (quoting

“[W]here statutory

and other extrinsic evidence should not be

consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent 0f the legislature.” Li.
(quoting City 0f

Sun Valley

V.

Sun Valley

C0., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963

(1993)).

The language of Section 19-2520G

is

plain.

“Any sentence imposed under the

provisions of this section shall run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the
court.”

I.C. §

19-2520G(3) (emphasis added).

The requirement

sentence run consecutive t0 “any other sentence”

means any
In other

sentence, irrespective of Whether

words the

were required

t0

statute

it

simply means what

run consecutively.

15

is all

inclusive;

that “[a]ny”

“any other sentence”

was ordered under LC.
it

says;

enhanced

§

19—2520G

0r not.

and as such the ﬁve sentences here

Barr eschews the
that “[t]he statute

literal

reading and instead adopts a literary reading.

mandates only

that

each of the mandatory

minimum

He

submits

sentences run

consecutive to ‘any other sentence imposed by the court,’ meaning consecutive t0 any
sentence other than a mandatory
statute.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16

Of course,
insofar as

it

minimum

(emphasis in original).)

this fanciful version

shoves in

sentence imposed under the provision of the

new language

looks nothing like the “plain language” of the text,

that

was never

there t0 begin With.

provision 0f the statute,” as Barr commodiously reads

statute t0

ﬂ

LC.

§

§

19-2520G(3).)

it.

it

(Compare Appellant’s

And had the

apply to “any sentence other than a mandatory

under the provision 0f the statute”

statute

does

minimum sentence imposed under

not say “any sentence other than a mandatory

p.16 (emphasis altered)

The

legislature

minimum

could have written that instead.

the

brief,

Wished for the

sentence imposed

It

did not.

E

I.C.

19-2520G(3).

Because Barr’s ﬁctive gloss cannot be found in the text he
grappling With

its

“plain language” at

all.

Much

less

does he show

fails to

error.3

show he
The

is

district

court correctly concluded, based 0n the statute’s plain language, that the sentences here

were required

to run consecutive t0 each

(12/28/17 T11, p.5, Ls.8-1

3

1;

other—because

that is

what the

statute says.

5/15/18 Tr., p.15, Ls.14-18.)

Barr’s alternative argument that the statute

is

ambiguous and subject

t0 interpretation

same reason: because the statute is plain and
should not be improvisatorially “construed” by reading things into it that
are not there. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.19-20) fails for the

unambiguous

it

16

Binding Idaho Caselaw Has Already Afﬁrmed That Section 19-2520G Requires

D.

That Sentences Imposed Under

It

Must Be Determinate Sentences

Barr additionally claims that the

2520G because

it

“failed to perceive

its

district court “misinterpret[ed]”

Section 19-

discretionary authority t0 order that a portion of

the ﬁfteen-year sentences be indeterminate.”

As

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)

it

happens,

the Idaho Court 0f Appeals has already addressed this very issue and resolved

Court has concluded that “the language of the statute here, LC.
the mandatory

minimum

it:

the

19-2520G, requires that

§

sentence be served in conﬁnement and, as such,

is

a ‘ﬁxed’ or

determinate sentence.” Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 179, 267 P.3d at 1294.

In

Ephraim the Court of Appeals considered and rejected arguments

makes now.

nearly identical t0 the ones Barr

district court

has discretion to designate an indeterminate and a determinate term 0f

And Ephraim

from the courts the

argued,

its

much

ability to set

sentence,” because, if

describe

it

219 P.3d 813
[I]n

(Ct.

267 P.3d

would have used

we

stated that,

action declaring a mandatory

remove

the

word “ﬁxed”

to

Citing State V. Patterson, 148 Idaho

why these

arguments

“where there has been no

minimum term of

failed:

legislative

imprisonment, thusly

canceling a court’s power to suspend sentences, such

power

t0

suspend

at 566 n. 5, 990 P.2d at 147
where
the statute dictates that
We
that,
a sentence be for a term 0f “conﬁnement,” it was clear that “the
legislature’s unambiguous intent that its Violation result in actual
imprisonment.” Patterson, 148 Idaho at 169, 219 P.3d at 813.

should be preserved.” Harrington, 133 Idaho

n. 5.

at

at 1293.

App. 2009), the Court explained

Harrington

267 P.3d

[a]

both an indeterminate and determinate portion 0f the

had, “the legislature

intention.” Li. at 178,

Li. at 177,

like Barr, that “the legislature did not intend t0

The Court 0f Appeals was not persuaded.
166,

were

as does Barr, that “the

Ephraim argued,

ﬁfteen-year sentence” imposed pursuant to Section 19-2520G.

1292.

that

then concluded [in Patterson]

17

We

reach the same conclusion here. Although LC. § 19—2520G does not
use the language “ﬁxed,” we reject Ephraim’s assertion that the word

“ﬁxed”

is

required for a statute to set forth a mandatory, determinate

sentence. In this instance, the statute requires a

0f conﬁnement

t0 the

mandatory minimum term

custody 0f the Board 0f Correction. In doing

invokes the legislative power under Section 13, Article

V

s0,

it

0f the Idaho

Constitution Which provides that any sentence imposed not be less than the
mandatory minimum or that the sentence be reduced. Accordingly, as in
Patterson we conclude that the language 0f the statute here, I.C. § I9—

2520G, requires that the mandatory minimum sentence be served
”
conﬁnement and, as such, is a “ﬁxed 0r determinate sentence.

Em,

152 Idaho

267 P.3d

at 179,

at

1294 (emphasis

therefore found that “the district court did not err

mandatory term of conﬁnement and refusing

afﬁrmed the ﬁfteen—year ﬁxed sentence.

by reading

t0 set forth

The Ephraim Court

I.C.

§

19—2520G

as a

an indeterminate term,” and

Li.

Ephraim the

In light of State V.

altered).

in

district

court

was

plainly correct

when

it

concluded that the “mandatory minimum” was “15 years ﬁxed 0n each count.” (5/15/18

TL, p.32, Ls.4-7 (emphasis added).)

It

is

Supreme] Court and the Court 0f Appeals
State V. Austin, 163 Idaho 378, 381,

axiomatic that “precedent from [the Idaho

is

binding upon the

413 P.3d 778, 781 (2018)

Idaho 49, 53, 205 P.3d 1185, 1189 (2009) (citing State

842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992)»;

b_ut

abuse of discretion Where “the
but Where

its

“decision

ﬂ

163 Idaho

Au_stin,

district court

was not

at

V.

district courts in

Idaho.”

(citing State V. Grist,

147

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986,

382, 413 P.3d at 782 (ﬁnding an

understandably relied 0n “binding precedent,

consistent With legal standards”). Because binding Court

0f Appeals precedent makes plain that Section 19—2520G “requires that the mandatory

minimum

sentence be served in conﬁnement and, as such,

sentence,” Barr fails to

0r “failed t0 perceive

show

its

that the

is

a ‘ﬁxed’ or determinate

district court “misinterpret[ed]”

discretionary authority”

18

when

it

Section 19-2520G

concluded the sentences were

(Appellant’s brief, p.6); Ephraim, 152 Idaho at 179, 267 P.3d at

required to be ﬁxed.

1294.

On

appeal Barr mostly rehashes the same arguments that were rejected in

(E Appellant’s

Ephraim.
will reveal

brief, pp.8-14.)

why Ephraim “was wrongly

Appellant’s brief, pp.1, 2,

And

despite repeatedly foreshadowing that he

decided and should be rejected 0r overruled”

he does nothing of the

6),

ﬁndings

there.

(E Appellant’s brief.)

already expressly rejected

brief.

many of the

Barr never explicitly mentions

sort.

Ephraim’s holding or discusses 0r quotes from (much

Nor does he

(ﬂ

less rebuts)

any 0f the Court’s

face the fact that the

now

rebooted claims that have

Ephraim Court

resurfaced in his

(E Appellant’s brief.)
The promised upheaval of Ephraim never

lukewarm parting shot
While the

at

instead, Barr ﬁres a

materializes;

Ephraim While wrapping up

his substantive argument:

was mandated

impose a uniﬁed ﬁfteenyear sentence[,] it retained discretion to designate what portion of the
ﬁfteen years would be determinate. Thus, even if the district court was
restrained by, and understandably relied 0n, the Court of Appeals’ holding
in

district court [here]

Ephraim

in believing that

it

to

lacked discretionary authority to designate a

portion 0f the sentences as indeterminate,

its

discretion represents an abuse 0f discretion.

failure t0 perceive that
Cf. State v. Austin,

it

had

163 Idaho

378, 382 (2018) (“[A]1though the district court understandably relied on
[binding Court of Appeals’ precedent],
legal

its

decision

was not

consistent with

standards [and therefore the district court] abused

its

discretion

....”)[.]

(Appellant’s brief, p. 14.)

This underwhelms.
distinguish Ephraim,

T0 show

that the district court erred Barr

Which the above passage does not even attempt

d0.

must

at least

Because

decisis “requires that this Court follow[] controlling precedent,” Barr’s other option

stare

is

the

daunting task of showing that Ephraim was “manifestly wrong, has proven over time to

19

be unjust 0r unwise, 0r overruling that precedent
principles of law and

remedy continued

P.3d 30, 33-34 (2015) (citing State

necessary t0 vindicate plain, obvious

is

injustice.”

State V.

Owens, 158 Idaho

1,

4-5,

343

Grant, 154 Idaho 281, 287, 297 P.3d 244, 250

V.

(2013)).

Barr

directly

fails to

meet

this

0n point and resolves

expressly rejected4

by

the

Ephraim

high burden.

this issue.

Nearly

all

ﬂ M,

158 Idaho

1,

4-5,

§

at 179,

show

267 P.3d

at

show

fails to

that decision

be unjust or unwise, or should be

Because the Court of

19-2520G “requires

sentence be served in conﬁnement and, as such,

sentence,” Barr fails to

152 Idaho

to

is

of Barr’s substantive arguments were

343 P.3d 30, 33-34.

Appeals has already concluded that Section LC.

minimum

controlling precedent that

Ephraim Court; furthermore, Barr

was manifestly wrong, has proven over time
overruled.

is

the district court erred

is

that the

mandatory

a ‘ﬁxed’ or determinate

by concluding

the same.

Ephraim,

1294.

4

Barr presents three substantive arguments on appeal regarding determinate time: a plain
meaning argument (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-1 1), a statutory construction argument
(Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-14), and a rule of lenity argument (Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-14).
The Ephraim Court expressly addressed the plain meaning of Section 19-2520G and
expressly rejected the claim that

152 Idaho

at

it

should be interpreted according to legislative

177-79, 267 P.3d at 1292-94.

And

while Ephraim did not speciﬁcally

address the rule of lenity that argument nevertheless
statute is plain, there is

no need

to construe

construction. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893,

it

20

fails

0n the

in the ﬁrst place,

265 P.3d

intent.

at 506.

merits.

much

less

Because the

apply canons 0f

III.

Any Event, His Claim Fails
On The Merits Because He Fails To Argue, Much Less Show, Fundamental Error

Barr Failed T0 Preserve His Constitutional Claim Below; In

A.

Introduction

Tagging along with Barr’s main argument

is

a separate constitutional claim: he

argues that “[t]he legislature’s attempt in section 19-2520G(3) to require courts t0 run

such sentences consecutively goes beyond

is

its

constitutional authority,” and, Barr thinks,

a “constitutionally impermissible” arrogation of the judiciary’s traditional, exclusive

discretionary

authority

it

not preserved.

is

decide

whether

(Appellant’s brief, p.24.)

concurrently.”

because

to

Defendants

sentence for the ﬁrst time on appeal.

constitutional claim for the ﬁrst time

run the

to

This argument

may

sentences

fails

consecutively

or

as a threshold matter

not raise a constitutional challenge to a

Accordingly, Barr cannot bring his late-breaking

on appeal Without arguing fundamental

error,

which

Barr has chosen not t0 d0.

Even
ﬁmdamental

if Barr’s constitutional

error.

LC.

§

19-2520G

claim has not been waived on appeal

is

constitutional,

and Barr

fails t0

it

show

fails to

that

its

show
effect

of ﬁxing consecutive sentences would constitute an improper deprivation 0f judicial
authority.

B.

Standard

Where
de novo.

Of Review

the constitutionality of a statute

is

State V. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 71

challenged the appellate court reviews

1,

69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003).

it

The party

challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome a strong presumption of

21

constitutionality.

that

upholds

its

Barr’s

C.

The

Li.

appellate court

constitutionality.

obligated t0 seek a construction 0f a statute

Li

Never—Before-Made

Nevertheless Fails

is

On The

Claim

Constitutional

Merits Because

He

Fails

Not

Is

Preserved,

And

To Argue, Much Less Show,

Fundamental Error
It is

“well established” that Idaho’s appellate courts “Will not address 0n appeal” a

constitutional “challenge t0 a defendant’s sentence

(Ct.

App. 1991) (appellant “failed

district court, and, accordingly,

trial

to raise [a] constitutional

he cannot

court

was not

ﬁrst

State V. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d

given an opportunity t0 consider the issue.”

1322

where the

now

raise

674

also State V. Cortez, 122 Idaho 439, 835 P.2d

it

(Ct.

argument before the

for the ﬁrst time

on appeal”);

App. 1992); State

V.

ﬂ

Samora, 131

Idaho 198, 199, 953 P.2d 638, 639 (Ct. App. 1998). In order t0 raise such a claim for the
ﬁrst time

error.”

on appeal a defendant would need

to

show

State V. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 P.3d 529,

m,

122 Idaho 1019, 1022-23, 842 P.2d 698, 701-02

Barr never argued below that Section
12/28/17 Tr.; 5/15/18 Tr.)

(Ct.

m

“constitute[d] fundamental

534

19-2520G

19-25207G

(Ct.

App. 2014));

App. 1992).
unconstitutional.

is

for the ﬁrst time

150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).

Appellant’s brief.)

it

(E

m

Barr would accordingly need t0 argue fundamental error t0

attack the constitutionality of Section

Pe_n'y,

that

Because appellants must

He

on appeal.

has not done so.

raise issues in their

(E

opening brieﬁng t0

preserve issues for appeal, Patterson V. State, Dep’t 0f Health &elfare, 151 Idaho 310,
321, 256 P.3d 718,

729 (2011), any claim 0f fundamental error challenging the

constitutionality of Section

19-2520G has been waived 0n

22

appeal.

Even

Not Waived, Barr’s Constitutional Claim
Because He Fails T0 Show Fundamental Error

D.

If

Is

It

Alternatively, to the extent Barr did not

claim

0n the

fails

To

merits.

Fails

On The

Merits

waive a fundamental error challenge, his

establish fundamental error,

the defendant bears the burden 0f persuading the appellate court that the

alleged error:

violates

(1)

one or more of the defendant’s unwaived

constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (Without the

need for any additional

information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to

whether the

failure t0 object

was a

tactical decision);

and

(3)

was not

harmless.

Li. at 228,

245 P.3d

First,

Barr

at

980. Barr has not established any of these prongs.

fails to

show any

constitutional Violation whatsoever.

“[t]he legislature’s attempt in [S]ection

19-2520G(3)

sentences consecutively goes beyond

constitutional authority”

impermissible

constitutionally

discretionary

authority

t0

its

intrusion

Whether

decide

the

into

t0

to require

judiciary’s

run the

He

claims that

courts t0 run such

and “amounts

traditional

sentences

t0 a

exclusive

consecutively

concurrently.” (Appellant’s brief, p.24.) This argument fails because the

0r

Ephraim Court

speciﬁcally addressed the constitutionality of Section 19-2520G, and expressly afﬁrmed

its

propriety in the context 0f determinate sentencing:

In this

instance,

conﬁnement

the

statute

to the custody

invokes the legislative

requires

a mandatory

minimum term of

0f the Board of Correction. In doing

power under

Section I3, Article

V

s0,

it

0f the Idaho

Constitution which provides that any sentence imposed not be less than
the

mandatory minimum 0r that the sentence be reduced. Accordingly, as
we conclude that the language of the statute here, LC. § 19—

in Patterson,

mandatory minimum sentence be served in
“ﬁxed” or determinate sentence. Thus, the
district court did not err by reading LC. § 19—2520G as a mandatory term
0f conﬁnement and refusing to set forth an indeterminate term.

2520G, requires
conﬁnement and,

152 Idaho

at 179,

that the

as such, is a

267 P.3d

at

1294 (emphasis

23

altered).

Moreover, under the second prong 0f fundamental error review, Barr must prove
that the alleged error “plainly exists.”

only plainly exists

if,

at the

Pm,

time the error was made,

showing by the appellant

“necessitates a

150 Idaho

(Ct.

App. 2012) (emphasis

State V.

An error

228, 245 P.3d at 980.

was

“clear or obvious.” Li. This

that existing authorities

resolved the issue in the appellant’s favor.”

P.3d 1227, 1231

it

at

have unequivocally

Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271
Barr cannot

in original).

make

that

showing

here because, as already demonstrated, the controlling authorities have unequivocally
ruled against his position: the Ephraim Court found that the statute properly “invoked the

legislative

at

179,

power under Section

267

P.3d

at

1294.

13, Article

And

V of the Idaho

Barr

Constitution.”

himself sensibly

“understandably rel[y]” on binding precedent such as Ephraim.

p. 14).

E

concedes

152 Idaho
courts

that

(E Appellant’s

brief,

Because defense attorneys likewise understandably rely on binding precedent, Barr

cannot show that the failure to challenge binding precedent was not a tactical move.
Finally, Barr fails to

show any

constitutional error

was not harmless. Keep

this in

mind: on appeal Barr has never raised the one claim that would not be barred by invited
error 0r

some

sentence

was

district

other self—inﬂicted procedural

excessive.

(E Appellant’s brief.)

court had the authority to sentence

sentences and could potentially give

clear

by Barr’s request

exercise

its

hurdle—an argument

for relief,

him

the

imposed

Indeed, he implicitly accepts that the

him

t0

ﬁve consecutive ﬁxed 15-year

same sentence 0n remand.

which only asks

discretion t0 decide Whether

that the

This

is

made

for “an instruction that the district court

any portion of the uniﬁed ﬁfteen-year sentences

should be indeterminate, and Whether those sentences should be served consecutively 0r

24

concurrently.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25.) Barr’s requested relief, 0n

the door

open

And

me

for

t0 receive the exact

to fashion that

5/15/18

that

him

While the

p.41, Ls.9-1 1)

shown

for

T11).

it

district court

was not

admittedly indicated

as severe if

never deﬁnitively stated

terms, leaves

it

I

it

thought

had the discretion

t0

“it

would be possible

d0 so” (5/15/18 TL,

would have fashioned such a sentence

any purported

errors

would be

in the

ofﬁng

for

him on remand, he

fails t0

show

were not harmless.

show any fundamental

0n the merits because

error.

CONCLUSION
The

(ﬂ

Because Barr has never claimed his sentence was excessive, and has never

that a different sentence

fails t0

own

same sentence 0n remand.

In sum, even if not waived, Barr’s constitutional claim fails

he

its

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 9th day 0f May, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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